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Abstract. Being the most popular permissionless blockchain that sup-
ports smart contracts, Ethereum allows any user to create accounts on
it. However, not all accounts matter. For example, the accounts due to
attacks can be removed. In this paper, we conduct the first investigation
on erasable accounts that can be removed to save system resources and
even users’ money (i.e., ETH or gas). In particular, we propose and de-
velop a novel tool named Glaser, which analyzes the State DataBase of
Ethereum to discover five kinds of erasable accounts. The experimental
results show that Glaser can accurately reveal 508,482 erasable ac-
counts and these accounts lead to users wasting more than 106 million
dollars. Glaser can help stop further economic loss caused by these de-
tected accounts. Moreover, Glaser characterizes the attacks/behaviors
related to detected erasable accounts through graph analysis.
1 Introduction
Being the largest blockchain that supports smart contract, Ethereum has two
kinds of accounts: EOA (Externally Owned Account) and contract account [17].
As a permissionless blockchain system, Ethereum allows any user to create many
EOAs through their private keys. Deploying a smart contract to Ethereum will
produce a contract account that contains the contract’s runtime bytecodes. Ev-
ery node must synchronize blockchain data, which includes blocks and StateDB
(State DataBase) [3]. The StateDB stores all the accounts’ state information,
such as ETH balance, transaction number, runtime bytecodes, and so on [3].
However, not all accounts should be kept. In particular, we identify three
kinds of erasable contract accounts that are produced due to contracts’ pro-
gramming errors or attacks, and two kinds of erasable EOAs that are produced
due to contracts’ deployment failure or DoS (Denial of Service) attacks. Such
erasable accounts not only waste system resources and affect the efficiency of
blockchain, but also easily waste users’ money (i.e., ETH or gas). For example,
one empty account (Address: 0x6e55..) discovered in this paper was created due
to contract deployment failure. It wasted user’s 137,552 gas when it was called
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because the contract’s runtime bytecodes were not stored in this account, whose
information is shown in Figure 1. We regard the worthless accounts that de-
serve to be removed without affecting the normal operations of users and other
accounts as erasable accounts.
Fig. 1. One empty account detected by Glaser.
Unfortunately, there lacks a systematic study on the erasable accounts that
can be removed. Although some studies [11] [10] use call graph analysis to
measure the control flow between contracts, their purposes are different from
ours. Our work focuses on the erasable accounts that exist in Ethereum, and
some of our analyzed accounts (e.g., DoS contracts) are related to interaction
between contracts. There also exist some other research analyzing different kinds
of security issues for smart contracts [13] or Ethereum architecture [15]. These
research mainly focus on security issues on the contract-level and system-level
of Ethereum, whose contents and purposes are different from ours.
To fill the gap, we design and implement a novel tool named Glaser (detect-
inG erasabLe AccountS in EtheReum) to discover erasable accounts by analyzing
the StateDB of Ethereum. It is worth noting that marking an account as erasable
just according to its liveness and balance value is improper, because an account
might contain useful runtime bytecodes or its private key is owned by external
user so that it cannot be removed even if it has not been used for a long time
and stores no ETH. Instead, Glaser analyzes accounts’ contents and states
stored in Ethereum StateDB. In detail, it leverages program analysis techniques
to discover contract accounts with worthless runtime bytecodes, and employs
state field and transaction analysis to discover EOAs that no one owns their
private keys. The accounts discovered by Glaser are worthless and deserve to
be removed without affecting the normal operations of other accounts/users.
Applying Glaser to all Ethereum accounts, we discovered 508,482 erasable
accounts, and more than 99.9% of them are still stored in Ethereum. These
erasable accounts have wasted users more than 106 million dollars and can be
removed through executing SELFDESTRUCT operation in their runtime bytecodes
by users, or removed forcibly by Ethereum officials. For example, one erasable
contract account (Address: 0xa30B..) can be removed through transaction sent
by any user, and some empty account created due to DoS attacks were already
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removed forcibly through hard fork by Ethereum officials [1]. This paper mainly
focuses on erasable accounts’ detection to help users identify erasable accounts
and remind users not to call them to save money, and erasable accounts’ char-
acterization to interpret their behaviors/attacks and creation reasons.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, we conduct the first systematic investigation
on erasable accounts in Ethereum. We propose and define five kinds of erasable
accounts, i.e., three kinds of erasable contracts and two kinds of erasable EOAs.
(2) We design a novel approach to analyze the Ethereum StateDB, and im-
plement the idea in a tool called Glaser, which can discover and characterize
erasable contract accounts and erasable EOAs. For contract accounts, leveraging
static analysis and symbolic execution, Glaser analyzes runtime bytecodes of
contracts to detect three kinds of erasable contract accounts. For EOAs, Glaser
analyzes their state-related attribute fields and historical transactions to dis-
cover two kinds of erasable EOAs. Glaser also characterizes erasable accounts
through call graph and creation graph analysis.
(3) We conduct experiments to evaluate and characterize the detected erasable
accounts. We analyze the 508,482 detected erasable accounts’ creation time dis-
tributions. More than 99.9% of them are still stored in Ethereum, and their
transactions wasted users more than 106 million dollars. Glaser can remind
users not to call erasable accounts and help stop further economic loss of users
caused by them. Furthermore, the graph analysis of erasable accounts interprets
their creation reasons, i.e., attacks, programming errors, or deployment failure.
2 Background
2.1 Ethereum
Supporting smart contracts, Ethereum records not only transactions but also
state transitions that occur in blockchain. Ethereum contains two types of ac-
counts, i.e., EOA and contract account [17], which are all indexed by 20 bytes
length of addresses.
Account’s creation and usage: Ethereum is a permissionless blockchain
system, and users can create their own EOA and store ETH (native cryptocur-
rency in Ethereum). Users can initiate transactions by the private key corre-
sponding to the EOA address, including ETH transfers and contract calls. The
contract accounts are created by EOAs or other contract accounts. In addition to
storing ETH, the contract account also holds the runtime bytecodes of smart con-
tract. There are two types of bytecodes in Ethereum: runtime bytecodes stored
in contract account, and deployment bytecodes used for contract runtime byte-
codes’ deployment. The contract account is not controlled by the user’s private
key, but by the contract’s runtime bytecodes’ logics.
Account’s removal: Users can only remove contract account through exe-
cuting SELFDESTRUCT in its runtime bytecodes. All EOAs and contract accounts
without SELFDESTRUCT in runtime bytecodes cannot be removed by users. In
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addition, all erasable accounts can be removed forcibly by Ethereum officials.
Although some discovered erasable accounts in this paper cannot be removed by
users, our results can remind users not to call them to save money.
StateDB: The StateDB stores the world state of Ethereum based on ac-
counts. For every account a, its state σ[a] consists of four fields [3]: If a is an
EOA, σ[a]n stores the number of external transactions sent from this account.
If a is a contract account, σ[a]n stores the number of contracts created by this
account. σ[a]b stores the balance value (in Wei) of account a. σ[a]s stores the
root hash of Merkle tree which encodes the storage contents of the account. σ[a]c
stores the runtime bytecodes of account a. Note that the main difference between
EOA and contract account is whether its code field is empty [3].
2.2 Smart Contract
In Ethereum, each node runs an EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine), and
the runtime bytecodes of contract are executed in EVM. Smart contract can
be developed through several Turing complete languages, such as Solidity (the
recommended language), Serpent, and Vyper [17].
Execution: When a smart contract is deployed in Ethereum, users can in-
voke its external functions through transactions. Note that we describe trans-
actions sent from EOAs as external transactions, and message-calls sent from
contract accounts as internal transactions in this paper. Gas is the basic unit
of resource consumption for transactions in Ethereum [6]. Before users initiate
transactions, they all need to pay a certain amount of gas. When the smart
contract is running in EVM, each opcode corresponds to a certain amount of
gas, whose value is defined in the Ethereum Yellow Paper [3]. To prevent DoS
attacks, Ethereum has modified the gas value of some specific opcodes, such
as SELFDESTRUCT’s value was modified from 0 to 5,000 in EIP-150 (Ethereum
Improvement Proposal) [6].
Data: The smart contracts’ execution in EVM involves three forms of data,
namely storage, memory, and stack [7]. The storage data is stored in StateDB of
Ethereum in the form of key-value pairs, and both key’s length and value’s length
are 256 bits [17]. Storage is persistent and will not be released as transaction
execution ends. Storage data is stored and read through two opcodes, i.e., SLOAD
and SSTORE. Memory is the temporarily allocated space when smart contracts
are executed in EVM, which is automatically freed as the transaction execution
finishes. EVM is a 1,024 depth stack-based virtual machine, and the contracts’
opcodes are all executed around the stack [16].
3 Erasable Accounts
3.1 Erasable Contract
The main difference between EOA and contract account is whether its code
field is empty [3]. Below we introduce erasable contracts with runtime bytecodes.
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Meaningless contract: We analyze two kinds of meaningless contract, i.e.,
MC-S (Meaningless Contract with STOP) and MC-RS (Meaningless Contract
with REVERT or SELFDESTRUCT).
MC-S refers to one particular kind of meaningless contract, whose first opcode
in its runtime bytecodes is STOP. There exist MC-S because users incorrectly
use runtime bytecodes to deploy contracts, whose creation and behavior will be
analyzed in Section 5. When the MC-S is called, STOP will halt the transaction’s
execution immediately. Therefore, these contracts are controlled by STOP, which
is meaningless and may waste user’s gas or ETH.
MC-S Example: One MC-S (Address: 0x2Ab7..) was called with input data
three times, which waste users’ gas. Their input data were not processed before
the related transactions were halted by STOP. Furthermore, this meaningless
contract was transferred ETH through transactions twice. Because the MC-S is
controlled by STOP, the total of more than 0.042 ETH stored in this account can
never be transferred out, which results in users’ money waste.
MC-RS refers to contract that has REVERT or SELFDESTRUCT opcode in its
first basic block. A basic block means a series of sequential opcodes without any
control flow operation (e.g., JUMP, STOP) [6]. The first basic block is the program
entrance and every call to the contract will execute it. Most MC-RS are deployed
by malicious contracts through internal transactions (i.e., sent from contract).
However, MC-RS is meaningless because any call to MC-RS will invoke REVERT
or SELFDESTRUCT. REVERT ends runtime bytecodes’ execution and reverts state
changes of the call. SELFDESTRUCT removes the contract account from blockchain.
0x0  PUSH1 0x00  //MC-RS-1
0x2  CALLDATALOAD  //get the first 32bytes call data
0x3  SELFDESTRUCT  //destruct the contract
0x0  PUSH1 0x80  //MC-RS-2
0x2  PUSH1 0x40
0x4  MSTORE  //save 0x80 to memory
0x5  PUSH1 0x00
0x7  DUP1
0x8  REVERT //end execution and revert state changes
0x9  STOP  
0xa  LOG2  //other basic blocks
…… ……
Fig. 2. Snippets of two MC-RS (i.e., with REVERT or SELFDESTRUCT in first basic blocks).
MC-RS Example: The snippets of two MC-RS are shown in Figure 2. There
are only three operations in the first MC-RS (Address: 0xa30B..). This contract
can be exploited by attacker to steal ETH through setting his own EOA address
in the call data. However, this contract is meaningless. Because any call to it will
invoke SELFDESTRUCT and transfer out the ETH stored in it. The second MC-RS
(Address: 0x7770..) will invoke REVERT during any call to it. Furthermore, the
operations after its first basic block will never execute. Any call to the contract
will execute operations from 0x0 to 0x8, which is meaningless and waste gas.
Stack or opcode error contract: EVM is a virtual machine based on
1,024 depth stack, and the stack will definitely overflow (push more than 1,024
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items into stack) or underflow (pop item from empty stack) if the stack error
contract is called. Before EIP-150 increased the gas cost of CALL from 40 to 700,
the attacker may exploit stack overflow through recursive call depth attack [17].
Nowadays, although stack overflow is hard to occur, stack underflow still exists
due to program writing errors.
Stack Error Contract Example: One transaction (Hash: 0x9518..) encoun-
tered “Stack Underflow” error and exhausted its gas, due to its contract deployment-
related codes. Moreover, runtime bytecodes’ contents may be related to some
uncontrollable factors, which may also produce stack error contracts. One exam-
ple of stack error contract’s deployment bytecodes is shown in Figure 3 (Related
transaction: 0xf7db..). In program counter 0x5, it returns runtime bytecodes to
deploy, whose first byte is related to the current block’s timestamp (in program
counter 0x0 to 0x1). At last, one stack error contract (Address: 0x7A03..) was
deployed, and its first operation in runtime bytecodes is DIV, which will result
in stack underflow.
0x0 TIMESTAMP //get the block's timestamp
0x1 CALLVALUE
0x2 MSTORE8 //save byte to memory
0x3 CODESIZE
0x4 CALLVALUE
0x5 RETURN //return bytecodes to deploy
Fig. 3. The deployment bytecodes of one stack error contract.
Developers can use high-level languages or directly write bytecodes to develop
smart contract. However, due to programming errors, some runtime bytecodes
deployed in blockchain cannot be disassembled to correct opcodes. If there exist
unknown opcodes that cannot be recognized by EVM, it will encounter “Bad
Instruction Error”. Opcode error contract refers to contract that has unknown
opcode in the first basic block, which will encounter error during any call to it.
Opcode Error Contract Example: The first two bytes of one contract’s run-
time bytecodes are 0xd929, which cannot be correctly disassembled to opcodes
of EVM. Because the unknown opcodes exist in its first basic block, all trans-
actions calling to it encountered “Bad Instruction Error” (Address: 0x5266..).
The transaction with “Bad Instruction Error” exhausts gas, halts execution and
reverts state changes [3].
DoS contract: We analyze two kinds of DoS related contracts: attacked
Parity wallets, and malicious contracts exploited for DoS attacks. If contract A
hardcodes and calls contract B’s address to execute, and B is removed, A will be
a dependency error contract without normal service. In November of 2017, the
attacker escalated his privilege and removed Parity’s multi-sig library contract
(Address: 0x863d..), which caused all Parity wallets that depend on it out of
service. Note that calling to a removed contract will just return 1 (means no
error or exception), and users cannot verify if it is out of service through return
value. If users knew in advance that their wallets were out of service, they would
not use them anymore to deduce financial losses. Etherscan only marks part of
attacked Parity wallets, we attempt to detect more of them.
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In 2016, the attacker exploited malicious contracts to initiate DoS attack
for Ethereum [17]. The attacker executes massive particular operations (e.g.,
EXTCODESIZE, DELEGATECALL), which consume low gas but high system resources.
The DoS attack leads to low nodes’ data synchronization and transaction execu-
tion. The Ethereum official modified many operations’ gas values in EIP-150 [17]
to repair related vulnerabilities.
Malicious DoS Contract Example: We analyze the malicious DoS contracts
and discover that they have similar patterns. These malicious contracts just
have one basic block in their runtime bytecodes. In the basic block, there are
many particular operations that consume low gas but high system resources. For
example, one malicious DoS contract’s snippets are shown in Figure 4 (Address:
0x7922..) with 200 EXTCODESIZE in the only basic block of the contract.
0x00 PUSH20 0x42a119d24fd64362f3892815d310c83edcb61b88
0x15 EXTCODESIZE 
0x16 POP
0x17 PUSH20 0xdfccc8e473dc262cfc6ddb4092946b66baadf88b
0x2c EXTCODESIZE //its gas was modified from 20 to 700
0x2d POP
0x2e PUSH20 0xd96b74abd2ded0b7f2873202a2f3bb562b22b2ef
0x43 EXTCODESIZE
0x44 POP
Fig. 4. Snippets of one malicious DoS contract.
3.2 Erasable EOA
Empty account: The empty account has the following features: ¶zero value
balance, ·zero value nonce, and ¸empty code. Whether the account has code is
the main difference between contract account and EOA, and we classify empty
accounts into erasable EOA. Ethereum officials have only cleaned up the empty
accounts created during the DoS attack exploiting SELFDESTRUCT [1]. However,
there still exist empty accounts due to contract deployment failure. Before EIP-2,
it will create an empty account if the contract deployment transaction does not
succeed (e.g., out of gas). After EIP-2, it will fail with error and do not create
empty accounts anymore. The creation process of empty accounts denotes that
they are not controlled by runtime bytecodes or external users, which results in
their uselessness. The empty account may result in gas waste, because users may
incorrectly think runtime bytecodes are deployed in these accounts.
Example: One empty account (Address: 0x6e55..) has been called many
times, which wastes users’ gas. We analyze all the input data of the related
transactions, whose first four bytes are all function signatures. That is to say, all
these transactions were intended to invoke the functions in runtime bytecodes.
DoS EOA: The DoS EOA has the following features: ¶1 Wei value balance,
·zero value nonce, ¸empty code, ¹zero historical external transaction, and
ºone historical internal transaction without error. The differences between empty
account and DoS EOA are their balance value and creation process. DoS EOAs
are created through internal transactions sent from contracts. Massive DoS EOAs
were created during the DoS attack in 2016, whose creation will be analyzed in
Section 5.1. The attacker created DoS EOAs through smallest financial cost
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(i.e., 1 Wei), and all of these accounts’ addresses were generated through com-
putation in runtime bytecodes, whose process denotes their uselessness (detail
in Section 6). The existence of massive DoS EOAs increases the StateDB size,
resulting in the waste of disk resources and nodes’ difficulty in syncing data.
Example: One transaction (Hash: 0x1aa8..) detected by Glaser created ten
DoS EOAs through internal transactions. Note that 1 Wei (1 ETH = 1018 Wei)
is the smallest cryptocurrency unit in Ethereum, which cannot even buy 1 gas.
The recommended gas price is 61 GWei [2] (1 GWei = 109 Wei), which can be
set in transaction by users.
4 GLASER
To analyze the StateDB, we synchronize the blockchain with “fat-db=on”
option through Parity client, which can build appropriate information to allow
enumeration of all accounts. Then we export the StateDB as plain text file
through Parity and leverage Glaser to traverse StateDB data to detect erasable
accounts. The overview of Glaser’s architecture is shown in Figure 5, which
mainly consists of three modules:
Symbolic execution
Static analysis
StateDB
Contract accounts
EOAs
Runtime bytecodes
Attribute fields
State field analysis
Transaction analysis
Account analysis engine
Account analysis engine
Erasable accounts Graph analysis
Erasable contract account's detection
Erasable EOA's detection
Fig. 5. Overview of Glaser’s architecture.
(1) Erasable contract account detection. In this module, Glaser detects
three kinds of erasable contract accounts: meaningless contracts, stack/opcode
error contracts, and DoS contracts. According to their respective characteristics,
we leverage different techniques, which mainly include runtime bytecodes’ static
analysis and symbolic execution.
(2) Erasable EOA detection. In this module, Glaser detects two kinds of
erasable EOAs: empty accounts, which are produced due to contract deployment
failure; and DoS EOAs, which are produced due to DoS attacks. We mainly
leverage state field and transaction analysis to discover erasable EOAs.
(3) Graph analysis for erasable accounts. For the detected erasable accounts,
Glaser characterizes their behaviors/attacks through call graph analysis and
creation graph analysis, whose details will be described in Section 6.
4.1 Erasable Contract Detection
Meaningless contract: Glaser leverages runtime bytecodes’ static anal-
ysis to detect two kinds of meaningless contract, i.e., MC-S and MC-RS. Static
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analysis refers to techniques that examine codes without attempting to execute
them [12]. Glaser statically analyzes contracts’ runtime bytecodes to detect
MC-S. In detail, it intercepts runtime bytecodes’ first byte to judge whether it is
0x00, which is the hex code for STOP. If one contract starts with 0x00 byte in its
runtime bytecodes, it will be tagged as MC-S. Glaser also statically analyzes
contracts’ runtime bytecodes to detect MC-RS. First, it disassembles contract’s
runtime bytecodes to acquire the opcodes. Second, it splits the opcodes into dif-
ferent basic blocks, which end with specific control flow operations (i.e., STOP,
JUMP, JUMPI, RETURN, SELFDESTRUCT, REVERT). Third, it analyzes the first basic
block. If REVERT or SELFDESTRUCT exists in the first basic block, it will tag the
contract as MC-RS.
Stack or opcode error contract: Glaser leverages symbolic execution
and runtime bytecodes’ static analysis to detect stack/opcode error contracts.
Symbolic execution uses symbolic values as inputs to simulate the process of
program execution [18]. The detection process of stack error contract is divided
into three steps. First, Glaser acquires the opcodes of contract’s runtime byte-
codes. Second, it splits the opcodes into different basic blocks and extracts the
runtime bytecodes corresponding to the first basic block. Third, it symbolically
executes the extracted runtime bytecodes leveraging Oyente [18], which is a
symbolic execution engine. If the symbolic execution process encounters “Stack
Underflow”, it will tag the contract as stack error contract. For opcode error
contract, Glaser disassembles contract’s runtime bytecodes into opcodes and
split them into basic blocks. Then Glaser detects whether there exist unknown
opcodes in its first basic block. If unknown opcode exists in its first basic block,
the contract will be tagged as opcode error contract.
DoS contract: Glaser leverages symbolic execution and runtime byte-
codes’ static analysis to detect DoS contracts. Glaser detects attacked Par-
ity wallet contracts leveraging symbolic execution techniques. Glaser ana-
lyzes four related operations for contracts’ interaction, i.e., CALL, CALLCODE,
DELEGATECALL, STATICCALL. If the symbolic execution encounters anyone of
these operations, it extracts the second item of the stack µs[1], which is used
as the address of contract being called. If µs[1] is a real value that matches the
address of removed Parity multi-sig library, it will tag this contract as attacked
Parity wallet. For malicious DoS contract, Glaser disassembles contract’s run-
time bytecodes into opcodes and split them into basic blocks. Then Glaser
analyzes the number and content of basic block. If one contract has only one
basic block and has more than 100 DoS related operations, Glaser will tag it as
malicious DoS contract. We analyze seven DoS related operations: EXTCODESIZE,
EXTCODECOPY, BALANCE, CALL, DELEGATECALL, CALLCODE, SELFDESTRUCT.
4.2 Erasable EOA Detection
Empty account:Glaser leverages account state field analysis and transac-
tion analysis to detect empty accounts. The detection process of empty accounts
is divided into two steps. First, Glaser analyzes the account attribute fields
9
to detect possible empty accounts, which should satisfy the three features de-
scribed in Section 3.2. Second, Glaser analyzes the historical transaction of the
detected empty accounts in the first step, to verify that they are created due to
contract deployment failure. In detail, it analyzes the oldest transaction related
to the accounts detected in the first step. If one account’s oldest transaction is
used for contract deployment, Glaser will tag it as erasable empty account.
DoS EOA: Glaser leverages account state field analysis and transaction
analysis to detect DoS EOA. Similar to the detection of empty accounts, de-
tection process of DoS EOAs is divided into two steps. First, Glaser analyzes
the account attribute fields to detect possible DoS EOAs, which should satisfy
the first three features described in Section 3.2. Second, Glaser analyzes the
historical transaction of the detected DoS EOAs in the first step, to verify that
they are created through internal transactions sent from contracts. In detail, we
set relatively strict conditions to verify DoS EOAs in this step. Glaser analyzes
their historical external transactions and internal transactions. If one account
has no external transaction and only one internal transaction without error (i.e.,
sent 1 Wei to create this account), we can conclude that it is an erasable DoS
EOA. There might exist massive internal transactions with “Out of Gas Error”,
which were used for DoS attacks.
5 Evaluation
We carry out experiments to answer the following research questions: RQ1
Quantity: How many each kind of erasable accounts can be detected through
Glaser? RQ2 Accuracy: To what extent can Glaser accurately detect erasable
accounts? RQ3 Waste: How much money lost due to erasable accounts?
5.1 RQ1 Quantity
In this section, we evaluate the quantity statistics of erasable accounts de-
tected through Glaser. Furthermore, we analyze the creation time distribution
of the detected erasable accounts.
Table 1. Quantity statistics of erasable accounts detected through Glaser.
Cat. Taxonomy Quantity Erasable accounts Quantity
¶ Erasable contract 481,087
Meaningless contract 479,153
Stack/opcode error contract 150
DoS contract 1,784
· Erasable EOA 27,395
Empty account 195
DoS EOA 27,200
We have exported the StateDB of Ethereum and detect erasable accounts
leveraging Glaser, whose quantity statistics are shown in Table 1. We dis-
cover 481,087 erasable contracts and 27,395 erasable EOAs respectively. All
the five specific kinds of detected erasable accounts’ addresses are published
on https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/11516694. For the 1,784 DoS
contracts, we detect 658 different contracts hardcode and call the removed Par-
ity multi-sig library, while Etherscan only tags 153 of them. Because most users
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leverage high-level languages to develop contracts, there exists a small quantity
of stack/opcode error contracts. Because Ethereum officials have already re-
paired the bug of empty account’s creation due to contract deployment failure,
the discovered empty accounts’ quantity is small.
To measure the number of erasable accounts at different time, we analyze
their historical transactions to acquire their creation time. The analysis of ac-
counts’ creation time is divided into two steps. First, we crawl all the historical
transactions related to the detected erasable accounts through Geth RPC APIs.
Second, we filter out the oldest transaction of each account and acquire the
timestamp of this transaction, which is the creation time of this account.
????????????
Fig. 6. Cumulative quantity distribution of meaningless contracts.
??????????????
?????????????1
Fig. 7. Cumulative quantity distribution of DoS contracts.
The cumulative quantity distribution of meaningless contracts at different
time is shown in Figure 6. Before July of 2019, the quantity of meaningless
contracts is small. Because most meaningless contracts are MC-S and they are
directly created by users through EOA. For example, one user (Address: 0x3ff5.
.) created 9 MC-S with totally same runtime bytecodes around February of 2018.
When the user realized his irrational behavior, he did not create MC-S any more.
After November of 2019, some active malicious contracts are massively called,
which leads to the quantity sharp growth of meaningless contracts (i.e., MC-
RS). For example, one Ponzi contract (Address: 0x7C20..) created many MC-
RS before April of 2020 through internal transactions (i.e., sent from contract
account). Because most users leverage high-level languages to develop contracts,
there exists a small quantity of stack/opcode error contracts. Their deployment
time distribution does not have clear trends or characteristics.
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The cumulative quantity distribution of DoS contracts at different time is
shown in Figure 7. There are two sharp growth periods for DoS contracts. The
first period is around October of 2016, the attacker deployed more than 1k ma-
licious DoS contracts and sent massive transactions to them, leading to external
transactions’ slow execution. The second period is around November of 2017, the
Paritys multi-sig library contract was attacked and removed during this period,
which produced 658 dependency error wallets without service.
The cumulative quantity distribution of empty accounts at different time
is shown in Figure 8. Because the Ethereum officials have repaired the bug of
empty accounts’ creation due to contract deployment failure and cleaned up the
empty accounts produced due to DoS attacks, the growing of their cumulative
quantity is halted around March of 2016. The cumulative quantity distribution
of DoS EOAs is shown in Figure 9. There is a sharp growth period of DoS
EOAs’ quantity around November of 2016. According to analysis, the attacker
(One exploited account: 0xeec2..) created massive DoS EOAs during/after the
DoS attacks of empty accounts’ creation exploiting SELFDESTRUCT [1].
Answer to RQ1 (Quantity): We have discovered 508,482 erasable accounts,
whose quantity distributions at different time reflect their creation reasons.
?????????????
Fig. 8. Cumulative quantity distribution of empty accounts.
?????????????
????????
Fig. 9. Cumulative quantity distribution of DoS EOAs.
5.2 RQ2 Accuracy
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of erasable accounts detected through
Glaser, whose statistics are shown in Table 2. We evaluate the accuracy of
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erasable accounts in two primary aspects. First, we analyze whether the de-
tected erasable accounts are still stored in Ethereum. Second, we analyze their
transactions to verify their uselessness.
Storage: Because it is difficult to traverse accounts in its changing Stat-
eDB, we export the StateDB to offchain and execute Glaser on it. Therefore,
there exists possibility that the detected erasable accounts are already removed
or cleaned up in the newest StateDB. We leverage Etherscan, which is a real-
time Ethereum block explorer, to verify their existence. We discover that 99.9%
(479,150/479,153) detected erasable contract accounts still store runtime byte-
codes. 3 MC-RS contracts are removed through executing SELFDESTRUCT. All
the 195 empty accounts can be still normally retrieved without special tagging,
and all the 27,200 detected DoS EOAs still store ETH. Therefore, more than
99.9% of the detected erasable accounts are still stored in the latest StateDB.
Table 2. Statistics of erasable accounts’ accuracy and waste evaluation.
Erasable account Quantity Storage Ext. tr. Int. tr. Gas ETH
¶ DoS contract 1,784 100% 3 26,474 7,707,646 50,497,619,162 515,035.16ETH
· Meaningless contract 479,153 99.9% 3 2,080 490,611 36,996,614,413 274.97ETH
¸ Stack/opcode error cont. 150 100% 3 141 157,513 854,099,555 0
¹ Empty account 195 100% 3 237 5 79,786,061 0
º DoS EOA 27,200 100% 3 0 1,163,763 1,180,693,660 27,200 Wei
Uselessness: In the following, we analyze the detected erasable accounts’
transactions to verify their uselessness. All the below analyzed transactions’ data
is published on https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/11518017.
For the 1,784 DoS contracts, we crawl all of their 26,474 external transac-
tions and 7,707,646 internal transactions. According to the timestamp of Parity
multi-sig library’s removal (Transaction hash: 0x47f7..), we extract 920 exter-
nal transactions of attacked Parity wallets that occurred after the attack. Apart
from pure ETH transfers, there are 789 external transactions calling wallets’
functions. Because calling to a removed contract does not result in failure or ex-
ception, we debug these transactions for analysis. We acquire these transactions’
execution traces through Geth API debug traceTransaction. All these trans-
actions called the removed library through DELEGATECALL, which wasted users’
gas or ETH. For malicious DoS contracts, there are 1,128 external transactions
used for contract deployments. All the other transactions (15,334 external trans-
actions and 7,700,836 internal transactions) executed with “Out of Gas Error”
were exploited for DoS attacks.
For the 479,153 meaningless contracts, we crawl all of their 2,080 external
transactions and 490,611 internal transactions for checking and debugging. Apart
from 2,002 contract deployment’s external transactions, 7 external transactions
were halted by the first executed operation STOP before their data fields were
processed, which verifies their uselessness. All the other 71 external transactions
were executed with “Reverted Error”. Apart from 489,890 internal transactions
used for contract deployment or compulsive ETH transfer through SELFDESTRUCT,
all the other 721 internal transactions were executed with “Reverted Error”.
For the 150 stack/opcode error contracts, we crawl all of their 141 exter-
nal transactions and 157,513 internal transactions for analysis. Apart from 150
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transactions used for contract deployment and 337 transactions used for com-
pulsive ETH transfer through SELFDESTRUCT, all the other 157,167 transactions
were encountered “Bad Instruction Error” or “Stack Underflow Error”.
For the 195 empty accounts, we crawl all of their 237 external transactions
and 5 internal transactions. Apart from 195 contract deployment’s transactions,
we analyze other 47 transactions. All of these 47 transactions transferred ETH
or called the empty accounts with function signatures in their data fields, which
denotes that they were intended to call a function of contract. However, all of
their data fields were not processed because the accounts were empty, which de-
notes their uselessness. For the 27,200 DoS EOAs, we crawl all of their 1,163,763
internal transactions, and there does not exist external transaction. In 27,200
internal transactions, the attacker created DoS EOA through transferring 1 Wei,
which is the smallest financial cost for the attacker. All the other 1,136,563 in-
ternal transactions were executed with “Out of Gas Error”, which were used for
DoS attack (analyzed in Section 3.2).
Answer to RQ2 (Accuracy):All the detected erasable accounts’ related trans-
actions are useless, and more than 99.9% of the detected erasable accounts are
still stored in Ethereum.
5.3 RQ3 Waste
In this section, we evaluate the money lost due to erasable accounts. We ana-
lyze the gas and ETH consumed in erasable accounts’ transactions, whose statis-
tics are shown in Table 2. For DoS contracts, 733,583,247 gas were consumed
during calling Parity wallets before they were attacked. Therefore, these gas are
not wasted. We analyze all the DoS contracts’ balance values and 515,035.16
ETH transferred to them are permanently locked in DoS contracts, which are
wasted. For meaningless contracts, all their consumed gas are wasted. However,
272.77 ETH attached to their transactions were returned to users due to “Re-
verted Error”, which are not wasted. For category ¸ to º, all their gas and
ETH are wasted. According to the gas prices set in transactions and ETH price
(204.36$/ETH) on May 25 of 2020 [2], 106,360,910$ is totally wasted due to
these erasable accounts.
Answer to RQ3 (Waste): About 89 billion gas and 515,037 ETH are wasted
due to erasable accounts, which are worth 106,360,910$.
6 Graph Analysis
We analyze attacks/behaviors related to discovered erasable accounts to an-
swer the question: How are erasable accounts behaved and created in reality?
Glaser’s graph analysis module can be divided into two parts, i.e., call
graph and creation graph. First, through symbolic execution, we analyze DoS
contract’s runtime bytecodes to generate call graph from erasable accounts to
other accounts. According to the definitions (in Section 3) of erasable accounts,
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only DoS contracts can call other accounts. During symbolic execution, we ana-
lyze the operands of DoS related operations (in Section 4). If the target address
of one operation is a real value, we can conclude that the DoS contract in-
teracts with another account and we add an edge into the call graph. Second,
through transaction analysis, we generate creation graph for erasable accounts.
We analyze the account creation related transactions of erasable accounts and
filter out their source addresses, which constructs the nodes of creation graph.
The creation related transactions construct the edges of creation graph. If the
erasable account is created through contract account, we also analyze which user
(i.e., EOA) calls the contract. Furthermore, we also analyze the creation source
address’s transactions to see whether it creates other accounts.
Call graph: According to their features, the DoS contracts can be divided
into two types, i.e., Many-to-One DoS contract and One-to-Many DoS contract,
whose topology graphs are shown in Figure 10. We only show the first three
bytes of contracts’ addresses for better display.
(A) (B)
Fig. 10. (A): Call graph of Many-to-One DoS contracts (best viewed in color). The
center contract has been removed (in red color), and some of its dependency error
contracts (in deep grey) still have ETH balance. (B): Call graph of One-to-Many DoS
contract. The malicious contract (in grey) executes massive EXTCODESIZE to external
contracts, which have all been removed.
For Many-to-One DoS contract, one center contract’s address is hardcoded
and interacted with many other contracts. Some Many-to-One DoS contracts de-
tected through Glaser are shown in Figure 10 (A). In this example, the center
contract (Address: 0x863D..) is Parity’s multi-sig library, which was attacked in
2017. The center contract is removed, all its dependant wallet contracts become
out of service (i.e., dependency error). Glaser has discovered 658 contract ac-
counts calling the removed library. We only show 20 attacked Parity contracts
in the figure for better display, and the nodes in deep grey color represent that
these erasable contracts still store ETH.
For One-to-Many DoS contract, one DoS contract hardcodes and interacts
with many other contracts. One example of One-to-Many DoS contract detected
through Glaser is shown in Figure 10 (B). In this example, Glaser has dis-
covered that one malicious DoS contract (Address: 0x7922..) hardcodes and
interacts with 200 different external contracts, which have all been removed. We
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only show 16 removed contracts in the figure, and the malicious DoS contract
(in light grey) is still stored in StateDB. Both types of DoS contracts might be
called, which will result in waste of gas or ETH. For example, one DoS con-
tract (Address: 0x4184..) shown in Figure 10 has been transferred ETH in 57
transactions, which can be avoided if its account was detected/alerted in time.
Creation graph: According to their features, the creation graphs can be
divided into two types: erasable account created by EOA, and erasable account
created by contract.
Erasable accounts were created by EOAs due to programming error or de-
ployment error, and we explain their creations through one meaningless contract
example, whose creation graph is shown in Figure 11 (A). The user (in red color)
called one deployed contract (Address: 0x2Ab7..) and realized that it was mean-
ingless due to deployment error. The user incorrectly used runtime bytecodes to
deploy the contract and transferred ETH to it. Then the user redeployed another
correct contract (in green color), whose runtime bytecodes are just same with
the data field of the transaction deploying the previous meaningless contract.
Note that these types of erasable accounts’ creation can be avoided, and it is
better to first test and deploy contracts in private/public Testnet before they
are deployed in Mainnet.
(A) (B)
Fig. 11. (A): Creation graph of one meaningless contract. After the user (in red) real-
ized the uselessness of the deployed contract (in grey), he redeployed another correct
contract (in green). (B): Creation graph of DoS EOAs. The attacker (in red) created
14 different DoS EOAs in one transaction. We show the last three bytes of the DoS
EOAs’ addresses.
Erasable accounts were created by contracts due to some attacks, and we
explain their creations through one DoS EOA example, whose creation graph
is shown in Figure 11 (B). The attacker exploited one EOA (Address: 0xc0ae..)
to call a malicious contract (Address: 0xeec2..), creating 14 different DoS EOAs
through internal transactions (Hash: 0xefc6..). Exploiting one storage variable,
the malicious contract can generate different addresses in different transactions.
These addresses were calculated and generated in runtime bytecodes, and only
the last three bytes of them are different. The attacker totally created 12,204
different DoS EOAs leveraging this malicious contract, resulting in the waste of
system resources and nodes’ difficulty in syncing data.
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7 Related Work
Frowis et al. [14] constructed call graph for smart contracts deployed in
Ethereum and discovered contracts calling to removed contracts. Note that they
focus on measuring the control flow immutability between contracts, whose pur-
pose is different from our work. Kiffer et al. [15] measured smart contracts’
creation and interaction with each other, which interpreted how are smart con-
tracts being used. However, they do not analyze erasable contracts that exist
in Ethereum. There are some other research leveraging symbolic execution [5],
static analysis [4] [9], and formal methods [19] to analyze different kinds of se-
curity issues for smart contracts. Kiffer et al. [15] measured the overall usage
of Ethereum, which interpreted how is Ethereum being used. They discovered
that SELFDESTRUCT’s usage rose sharply during DoS attacks in 2016. However,
they do not measure or analyze erasable accounts produced during DoS attacks.
Chen et al. [8] proposed an adaptive gas cost mechanism for Ethereum to de-
fend against under-priced DoS attacks. They do not analyze real accounts in
Ethereum that are related to these attacks. Wang et al. [20] proposed an op-
timization storage engine to reduce nodes’ storage volume, which can improve
the scalability of blockchain systems. They do not analyze the erasable accounts
which are already stored in StateDB. Angelo et al. [13] analyzed contract de-
ployment code patterns which were exploited by attackers, and they described
three related attack scenarios in reality appeared in the middle of 2018, whose
contents and purposes are different from ours. They focus on the vulnerabili-
ties and attacks leveraging skillfully crafted deployment codes, while we detect
erasable accounts due to programming or deployment errors.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion: We discuss validity threats, limitations, and future work. (1)
Glaser can not only discover erasable accounts that already exist in Ethereum,
but also erasable accounts that might be created in future. Some kinds of ac-
counts analyzed by Glaser might also be created in future, and Glaser might
discover more erasable accounts. (2) For the discovered erasable accounts, only
part of meaningless contracts can be destructed by ordinary users. Because some
MC-RS have SELFDESTRUCT in their first basic blocks, which can be invoked
through transactions by users. Although most of discovered erasable accounts
cannot be easily destructed by users, our results can remind users not to call
them, which can help users save money. (3) Path explosion and timeout excep-
tion are common threats for the symbolic execution techniques leveraged in this
paper. However, we use some methods to reduce these threats. During detecting
stack error contracts, we first extract runtime bytecodes corresponding to the
first basic block and then symbolically execute them. During detecting attacked
Parity wallets, we first filter out contracts without external call operations and
then symbolically execute them. (4) As Glaser focuses on five kinds of erasable
accounts in Ethereum, we will detect more kinds of erasable accounts in future.
We will also analyze erasable accounts in other blockchain systems.
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Conclusion: We have conducted the first work that systematically char-
acterizes erasable accounts in Ethereum, i.e., erasable contract accounts and
erasable EOAs. We have implemented Glaser to analyze the StateDB, which
can detect erasable accounts leveraging bytecodes’ static analysis, symbolic ex-
ecution, transaction analysis, and state fields analysis. Furthermore, we have
analyzed attacks/behaviors related to erasable accounts through graph analysis.
Extensive experiments are also conducted to evaluate the quantity, accuracy,
and waste of the detected erasable accounts.
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